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THE HUDOOD LAWS OF PAKISTAN:
A SOCIAL AND LEGAL MISFIT IN TODAY'S SOCIETY
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ABSTRACT

This article questions the application of religion in Pakistan, specifically in the legal context. For over two decades now, Pakistan has had
on the books a number of statutory laws, which are collectively known
as the Hudood Laws. These laws are purported to inject Qu 'ranic
doctrine into Pakistan's criminal legal structure. Un.fortunately, a number of shortcomings have been identified with the change since its
beginnings. Among these faults are a lack of religious knowledge and
understanding by the judiciary, police force, and population; misuse
and abuse of the laws by the nation's ruling elite, men, and the police;
lacking legal and social infrastructure in support of the laws; and most
devastatingly, imprecise and many times incorrect interpretation of
Islam and its legal teachings. Out of respect for the divine law, an
appeal is made .first to suspend the Hudood laws, if not to cease their
resulting injustices. It is subsequently recommended that a committee of
legally and theologically trained experts be formed, that they re-examine Islam's legal teachings, and finally that they explore a just and
appropriate manner in which to introduce correct principles to current
Pakistani society and its primarily common law system.
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Lahore American School in Pakistan. He later attained a B.Com at McGill University before
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throughout five continents. Aarij speaks both English and Urdu, has a basic understanding of
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Author's Note:
It is important for the reader to understand the perspective from which
the following paper is written. I believe that the Qur 'an is a divine book,
one which I see as the guidebook to living life. Law, in both practice and
theory, is a large part oflife. Shari 'ah translates as "the path to follow; a
name given to the sacred law of Islam that governs all aspects of a
Muslim's life." 1 One of the fundamental principles of Islam and of its
Shari 'ah is the seeking of truth. This paper is not an attempt at bringing
into question Islam or Shari' ah or any of its teachings, including the
principles of Hadd as laid out in the Qur 'an itself; for that would be
bringing in to doubt the very faith I hold so dear. What this work is,
however, is a study and critical analysis of the application oflslamic law
in Pakistan. It is an unfortunate reality that even such pursuit of knowledge and the truth is perceived by many as apostasy, due to the prevalence of what I term as an 'illiterate culture' - nevertheless, the reality is
that such analysis and critique is desperately necessary. Justice, the
process of development, and a hope for a better tomorrow demand it.
Indeed, it is precisely this lack of commentary and academic debate
about such topics which has kept the entire Muslim world's identity
crisis aflame, and left its people deprived of their dreams and true
potential.

In the name of God (Allah): The most gracious, the most merciful.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, entering into the second year of their most recent of (Pakistan's
frequent) periods of martial law, the people of that nation had largely
adapted to the changes brought about by the displacement of democracy. For the majority of the population, these changes were, in practice,
minimal; as inhabitants of a still-developing country, the focus of the
people had remained on daily sustenance and the fulfilling of their other
M. Lippman, S. McConville & M. Yerushalmi, Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure: An
Introduction (New York: Pruger, 1988) at 25 [Lippman, McConville & Yerushalmi].
1
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basic needs. This changed the following year, however, as Pakistan's
military dictator, President General Zia-ul-Haq, introduced the Hudood
Ordinances and Rules to Pakistan's criminal branch of its legal system.
These were the first set of 'Islamic' statutes to be incorporated into a
previously mixed legal system of British common law and Muslim
personal law. An already adulterated legal system had become ever
more mixed, and because of inherent weaknesses within that system, the
people of Pakistan would now be judged ever more harshly, unfairly,
and incorrectly.
The following is a basic survey of the nature and effects of the
Hudood Ordinances of Pakistan. It aims to examine the scope of the
laws, their legitimacy, and finally examples of their application. It will
be argued that Islamic law, while valid in its own right and on its own
merit, was not suited for introduction to Pakistan, given the socioeconomic conditions of the time. The following sets out to show that an
in-depth knowledge of Islam, with an emphasis on its legal aspects, is
both indispensable and decisively lacking in the Pakistani legal system,
from its police officers to its lawyers to the justices of its courts. This
fact, in tandem with the social realities of Pakistan, makes the just
interpretation of any law not merely improbable; as will be shown, it
makes the just interpretation of Islamic law impossible.
This paper begins by laying out the historical background to the
legal events that took place in 1979 and afterwards, and the impact that
they have had on Pakistan since. This is followed by a short introduction
to Islamic law, including its definition, sources, and a brief overview of
its historical evolution. The most relevant concepts of Islamic law to the
Hudood Ordinances are then discussed, including Hadd and Ta 'azir.
These tenns are defined and the entailing offences, punishments, purposes, evidentiary requirements, and underlying values are examined. A
brief examination of the specific Pakistani context is followed by an indepth analysis of Pakistan's Hudood laws, which begins with a brief
look at Pakistan's legal history and ends with a critique of the laws'
application and legitimacy. This analysis includes an examination of the
statutes themselves, procedural aspects of implementation, and the Islamic laws' evolutionary effect on Pakistan's legal system. In turn, each
of the ordinances is examined separately. Attention is given to the rules
as legislated, their exceptions, limitations or pre-conditions, if any, and
criticisms against their legitimacy. Finally, this analysis will expand on
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the conclusion that Pakistan's Hudood laws be suspended immediately
and indefinitely, until such time that Pakistan is deemed socioeconomically, culturally, and religiously ready to properly implement divine
law.

1. History & Background
At midnight on August 14, 194 7, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was
carved out of British India, the product of decades of both political and
legislative wrangling from London to Bombay. 2 The five provinces to
comprise the new nation were inhabited by vastly different peoples with
a divergent assortment of languages and cultures. Arguably the only
thread linking these various groups was their common religion, namely
that oflslam. 3 Today, somewhat reduced in size by the loss in 1971 of
the province of East Pakistan (now the independent nation of
Bangladesh), Pakistan's population of nearly 150 million is approximately ninety seven percent Muslim. 4
For a variety of socio-economic reasons, Pakistan since the late
1970s has been struggling through a period of Islamization. 5 This has
meant, inter alia, greater awareness of Islam and its applicability to
daily life among Pakistan's populace. 6 It has also meant the emergence
ofreligious extremism and increased use ofreligion as a political tool. It
was the combination of these two factors that lead to the proclamation
on February 10, 1979, of the Hudood Ordinances by the then military
dictator of Pakistan, President General Zia-ul-Haq. 7
The Islamization of Pakistan had already begun earlier that year,
however, with the introduction of the Shari 'ah, or Islamic, Courts. 8
2

S. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 340.
L. Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Kent: Dawson Westview, l 980)
at 26.
4
United States, Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact book ( 1999), online: Central
Intel Iigence Agency <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publ ications/factbook/geos/pk.html#People>.
5
L. Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Cemw:v: A Political HistOIJ' (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 462 [Ziring].
6
Pakistan, introduction ofHudood lall's in Pakistan (Islamabad: Pakistan Publications, 1985)
at 4 [Pakistan].
7
Ibid. at 11.
8
Ziring, supra note 5 at 465.

3
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While it was argued at the time that the religious courts were meant tc
supplement the existing conventional court structure rather than replace
it, great controversy was nonetheless aroused by its inception. Such was
the case with many of Zia's "high priority" refonn agenda items. 9 His
justification was simply that the establishment of such courts would
enable the proper implementation of' Islamic justice,' the very thing, he
argued, that Pakistan had been created for in the first place. The function
of the new court, located in the capital city of Islamabad, would be to
determine whether existing laws were in violation of Islamic principles
and injunctions. 10
With both the Federal Shar'iah Court and the Hudood Ordinances in
place, a vigorous new campaign from the government called for mass
conformity to "Islamic codes of behaviour." From that point forward,
drinking alcohol, attending bawdy houses, and gambling (among other
offences) were all deemed to be crimes against Islam the first such
crimes in Pakistan's legal history. Zia called on the nation to fulfill their
recreational needs through prayer, family activity, and constructive
social acts, and threatened that the new laws would deal harshly with
any violation of the new code. From the beginning, this threat was
carried out with vigour. Public lashings, for example, took place on
numerous occasions immediately following the enactment of the new
laws. However, more brutal punishments common to other countries
practicing Shar'iah, including the removal of limbs, were initially discouraged. 11
It is important to note that since Pakistan's inception, its legal
system had been a ramshackle and clumsy machine. Prior to the introduction of the Hudood Ordinances, Pakistan's legal system had been
composed of an uneasy mix of colonial legislation, Koran-derived laws
of inheritance, and Muslim personal laws, the latter dealing mostly with
family matters. 12 Islamic "public" law was the most recent addition to an
already complicated and unwieldy system. It was argued at the time that
the Islamization of Pakistan's law was imperative, because Islamic law
was perceived as the sum and substance of Islam itself. The purpose of
" Ziring, supra note 5 at 466.
10
Ziring, supra note Sat 465.
11
Ziring, supra note 5 at 466.
12
A. Jahangir & H. Jilani, A Divine
Books, l 990) at 17 [Jahangir & Jilani].

The Hudood Ordinances (Lahore: Rhotas
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law, it was stated, is to "bend earthly life to the purposes of God." 13 To
do so would signify Pakistan's allegiance to the Qur'an, both in abstract
and as a concrete legal code - necessary, it was argued, since in Islam
the state is conceived of as a moral institution charged with enforcing
stipulations as set forth in the Shar 'iah, including the Sunnah, or teachings and traditions of the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him). It
can neither add, alter, nor abrogate it. 14 Islamic law is nothing but
Allah's message of what a man must do and what a man must avoid
doing. Specifically, the 'resurgence' of Islam in Pakistan was seen
widely as the responsibility of the Muslims themselves, without further
divine guidance. 15 A step towards Islamization was urged to be seen as a
"transition from indifference to self-directing determination," part of
which would lead to, it was hoped, the foundation of a new phase of
legal dynamism in the nation. 16 It was argued from the outset that
"Islamisation of laws and jurisprudence in Pakistan is an effort to bring
all temporal laws in conformity with the will of the divine enshrined in
the Shari 'ah." 17
Zia's Islamization of Pakistan included numerous other acts of
reform, all limited in success, the totality of which eventually led to his
government's admission of its inability to "counter the demagogic
manipulation of controversial issues." 18 In fact, time and again, the
fallout from the program would prove to be an embarrassment to his
government, both through the identification of flaws and the realization
of the basic inapplicability of such reform to Pakistan's already volatile
society. While Islamization was seen to be prima facie a desirable
objective of a nation that was at the time ninety five percent Muslim, it
had proven from the beginning to be a dangerous and precarious job. 19
This was due to the increasing volatility in the social fabric as a result of
the changes, the heightened questioning of not only Zia's reforms, but
his leadership itself, and the confusion being caused by a sudden and
rapid development in an otherwise stable, albeit ineffective, legal sysPakistan, supra note 6 at 3.
Pakistan, supra note 6 at 5.
15
Pakistan, supra note 6 at 5.
16
Pakistan, supra note 6 at 4.
17
Pakistan, supra note 6 at 6.
18
Ziring, supra note 5 at 467.
19
Ziring, supra note 5 at 467.
13
14
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tern. Plagued by a continuing lack of success, and under political pressure both at home and abroad, Zia finally slowed the process, though the
overall campaign continued. Unfortunately, this change of pace,
coupled with Zia's mounting frustration, transformed the process from a
morally idealistic initiative to little more than a political tool. The
government began removing allegedly "anti-Islamic" reading materials
from schools and libraries and banning films and books it judged to be
hedonistic, immoral, or contrary to Islamic principles. Provincial governments were given the authority to police sermons during Friday
prayers. The government even issued an ordinance making it a violation
of the law to preach hatred against other beliefs, or against the ruling
government. It appeared that Zia's government had claimed spiritual
legitimacy for all its actions. Nonetheless, by and large, the program of
Islamization existed more in theory than in practice. 20
There were also personnel problems with Zia's political movement.
Expansion of the Shari'ah Courts required far more scholars of the
Shari 'ah itself and fiqah law, or legal theology, than were readily
available. Zia had predicted that this void would be filled from within
the madrasahs, or religious welfare schools. However, reality dictated
that the courts would still be shorthanded. 21 The staff available to the
Shari 'ah Courts was inadequate in both their numbers and their qualifications, despite the intentions of Zia's Constitutional arnendrnents. 22
This problem was particularly acute at the district level. While it was
planned to include at least two learned scholars of Islamic jurisprudence
in each jurisdiction, filling the gap with truly competent Pakistanis
proved to be impossible. The importation of judges from other Muslim
nations was tabled as a possible solution, but was not implemented due
to yet another fundamental dilemma; namely, that the foreign justices
would not have possessed the required understanding of Pakistan's
society to justly apply the law - theoretically, the purpose of the reform
in the first place. Towards the end of Zia's rule, it had become painfully
clear that the ambitions of the Islarnization program had far exceeded
Pakistan's limited available human resources. 23 This was yet another
Ziring, supra note 5 at 467.
Ziring, supra note 5 at 469.
22
M.A. Khan, ed., The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Karachi:
Pakistan Law House, 1996.)
23
Ziring, supra note 5 at 469.
20
21
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factor that contributed to the slowing of the reforms. It had, moreover,
become clear that the Islamic state which Zia's regime was t1ying to
create was being impeded by chronic and widespread underdevelopment. The problem lay not in the idea, but in its time and place of
application. Pakistan, it seemed, was attempting too much, too soon.
Over and above this, it appeared that the proponents of a more religious
order in Pakistan themselves disagreed on too many of the required
fundamentals of an Islamic state, the establishment of which being a
necessary prerequisite to the just application of Islamic law. 24
In the end, to salvage at least a partial success, Zia sought grassroots
support by portraying the Islamization campaign as an attempt to improve the lives of Pakistan's impoverished masses, especially in the
villages with their limited access to conventional legal remedies. This
was not mere propaganda; he was apparently sincere in his belief that
religious courts were the best (perhaps the only) method of bringing
justice to the peasant populace of Pakistan. 25
Professor Lawrence Ziring comments on Zia in his book "Pakistan
in the Twentieth Century: A Political History":
The common folk, he would opine, could not be expected to bring
their everyday grievances to courts dispensing Anglo-Saxon justice.
The rural people, though ignorant of their rights in the Common Law,
nevertheless had legitimate grievances that could only be addressed
within the cultural context of their religious lives. 26

While critics of the time conceded that justice for all of the country's
citizens would involve different approaches, the point nonetheless remained that Zia's initiative - the introduction of an Islamic legal system
to a predominantly secular one - was a decidedly inadequate solution.
While proponents of a purely Islamic legal system today still support an active and organized lobby in Pakistan, they lack large-scale
popular support.27 This is evidenced by the traditionally poor performance of the religious political parties in Pakistani elections, 28 though
this may, judging by the results of Pakistan's October 2002 general

24
25
26
27

28

Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 17.
Ziring, supra note 5 at 469.
Ziring, supra note 5 at 469.
Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 17.
Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 17.
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elections, be changing. While this traditional lack of support does not
mean that the masses' legal needs could not be better served by Islamic
law, it may very well indicate a lack of understanding of that law, or
worse, an indication of the inherent flaws in the post-reforn1 justice
system as a whole. The problem may lie deeper than the specific legal
system that the courts adjudicate under. Nonetheless, the religious elements in Pakistani society do maintain substantial political clout, and
have repeatedly hijacked reforms seen as inconsistent with their view of
Islam and Islamization. Indeed, even Benazir Bhutto's left-of-centre
government did not revoke, suspend, or amend the Hudood laws, despite her two terms in office. It appears that the laws were kept intact in
an effort to hold together often precarious coalition governments, in
which the religious parties were a critical pillar. This hijacking of
reform is normally carried out in the name of religion, a potent tool with
the power to inflame the masses, incite civil unrest, and even destabilize
the government itself. This consequently can sabotage the basic intentions of the reformists, thus bringing the process full circle. It is possible
that Bhutto's government was threatened with such action if any attempt
to 'de-reform' the legal system was made. In this dynamic, the mass
ignorance of the masses towards their own religion cannot be overstated
in its significance; indeed, the same can be said of the majority of the
current proponents of continued Islamization. In both these cases, ignorance truly is bliss, and is used to its full political advantage.

2. Islamic Law
Islamic law, commonly referred to as the Shari 'ah, stems from four
sources: 29 these include the Qur'an; the Sunnah as defined above; reasoning through analogy; and consensus among Ulema, Muslim scholars
and the guardians of Islamic legal and religious traditions. 30 While this
might suggest very little codification or rigidity within the legal structure, by the early tenth century the opposite had become the case. The
scholarly consensus at the time asserted that the door of ijtihad, or the
use of individual judgement to interpret existing law and establish legal
29
30

N.J. Coulson, A Histmy of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U. Press, 1978) [Coulson].
Lippman, McConville & Yerushalmi, supra note I.
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decisions, was closed. 31 The consensus for this decision, or the ijma, set
the final seal upon the gradually increasing rigidity of Islamic law. 32 In
essence, Islamic jurisprudence had resigned itself to nothing more than
self-imposed terms of reference. 33 Regardless of whether this should
ever have occurred, a limited number of laws were to remain codified
and unchangeable. These are the laws of Hadd (pl. Hudood), or the only
offences proscribed by God Himself and punishable by the penalties set
forth in the Qur'an. 34 Accompanying these specific provisos are strict
evidentiary or proof requirements, the failure of which allow secondary
or discretionary punishment of the offending behaviour, otherwise
known as Ta 'azir punishments. 35 Additionally, there are Ta 'azir offences, independent in their own right from offences of Hadd. Both
categories of offence are discussed below.

3. Hadd

Hadd, when translated, reads: "measure, limit or obstruction." 36 The
Qur'an and the Sunnah explicitly set out all the Hadd offences and their
corresponding punishments, which can thus neither be altered nor modified. 37 The explicit mention of a small number of heinous offences aims
to expunge them from Islamic society, ensuring the preservation of
Islamic values of the dignity of human society and the purification of the
human soul. 38 It is important to note that in all Hadd crimes, punishment
is to be directly proportionate to the magnitude of the crime committed.
These punishments are intended to deter people from causing harm and
mischief, 39 to humiliate the offender, 40 and to educate the public. 41 In

31

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 28.
Coulson, supra note 29.
Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 28.
Coulson, supra note 29.
Coulson, supra note 29.
Pakistan, supra note 6 at 7.
Pakistan, supra note 6 at 7.
Pakistan, supra note 6 at 6.
Pakistan, supra note 6 at 7.
Pakistan, supra note 6 at 8.
Pakistan, supra note 6 at 9.
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addition, one or more of the Haddpenal laws may have reformation and
prevention as additional goals. 42
Crimes falling under the category of Hadd include: Zina (adultery or
fornication); the use of intoxicants (including alcohol and drugs); theft
of property; robbery of travellers; Qazf (false accusations of adultery);
and apostasy. These offences can be established either by a voluntary
confession made before the court, or by the testimony of a specific
number of eyewitnesses - four in the case of Zina, two for all other Hadd
offences. These evidentiary requirements are further clarified. In cases
of Zina, for example, actual vaginal penetration needs to be witnessed in
order for the testimony to be deemed admissible for consideration. In all
Hadd cases, the witnesses must be sane, adult, male Muslims of piety.
They must never have been convicted of Qazf or other slander, and the
court must be satisfied that they are truthful, abstain from major sins and
maintain the inclination not to indulge in minor ones. 43 Courts are
required to carry out an investigation on prosecution witnesses called
"purgation." Unfortunately, neither the courts nor the law have established a uniform method for purgation; in practice, each judge follows
his own methods, ranging from cross-examination of witnesses to inquiries among their community regarding their characters. Yet some
judges have failed to carry out purgation due to lack of knowledge of the
law or simple carelessness. 44 This can often work against the accused, a
problem that is compounded when competent counsel is unavailable to
request purgation, or due process. 45
Prior to any discussion of the severe punishments of Hadd, it is
imperative to note some of the values underlying the Islamic law, which
acts as its foundation. First, such punitive measures are only to be
administered if the offences are proved conclusively and beyond any
chance that an innocent person will suffer undeserved punishment.
Second, where the rights of an individual are concerned, every attempt
must be made to ensure that they are not violated. 46 Third, in cases where
liability for the crime cannot be attributed to any one individual, the
people of the locality at large must compensate the victim. Finally,
42
43
44

45
46

Pakistan, supra note 6 at 9.
Pakistan, supra note 6 al 7.
Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 62.
Jail Criminal Appeal 267/1of1985 Khuda Baksh.
Pakistan, supra note 6 at I 0.

74 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

Islamic jurisprudence does not traditionally encourage or approve of
long-term imprisonment. 47 These four principles, in theory, underpin
any application of punishment.

4. Ta'azir
The word Ta 'azir translates as "punish."48 In cases where the strict
requirements of proof for Hadd offences are not met, Ta 'azir punishments or discretionary punishments for non-Hadd offences may be
applied. In fact, the vast majority of violations under the category of
Hudood are punished as Ta 'azir offences, rather than Hadd. 49 This
enables the continuity of the Hadd's deterrent factor, while at the same
time maintaining just proportionality amongst proven offences. 50
Ta 'azir punishments include: slapping, lashing or flogging (at most
thirty-nine times in total); exile; imprisonment for the purposes of
producing repentance; public proclamation of the convict on a donkey's
back; admonition or reprimand (involving slapping and beating); abandonment; compensation payable to the victim in cases of displaced
property; monetary compensation for injury; and suspension or dismissal from one's workplace. It is impo11ant to note that Hadd punishments are seen as the exception rather than the rule, since it is so difficult
to establish the required burden of proof. Ta 'azir punishments are thus
far more frequently invoked, and thus an in-depth discussion of them is
warranted in any analysis of Hudood laws.
In Pakistan, with the promulgation of the Hudood Ordinances and
Rules, a number of legal changes have taken place through the introduction of Ta 'azir punishments. For example, prior to the Hudood laws,
children under the age of seven bore no criminal liability, and children
under the age of twelve were punishable only if they understood the
nature and consequences of their acts. While the Hudood Ordinances
exempt children from Hadd punishments, this is not so with Ta 'azir
punishments. For example, the Ta 'azir punishment for Zina committed

47

Pakistan, supra note 6 at 11 .
Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 24.
49
Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 31.
so Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 9.
48
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by children, though lighter than that for adults, is nonetheless a five-year
sentence and thirty discretionary stripes. For all other Ta'azir offences,
children are tried and punished as adults. In one notorious case, a child
was awarded two years rigorous imprisonment a more severe sentence
that usually denotes a term of hard labour for the convicted criminal for stealing the equivalent of eight Canadian dollars. 51 On the other
hand, Ta 'azir punishments for theft and armed robbery are the same
today as they were under the old penal code of 1860. The maximum
duration of imprisonment permissible for theft, for instance, remains
three years. 52 The rules of evidence for Ta 'azir offences are the same as
those for all other so-called regular crimes.
As mentioned earlier, Hadd punishments are only awarded to adults.
Adulthood is defined in terms of age and sexual maturity - offences of
theft and drinking, for example, require the accused either to have
experienced puberty or reached the age of eighteen. For Zina and Qazf,
the same standard applies for boys; for girls, either puberty or the age of
sixteen must have been reached. This definitional standard, equating
mental development with sexual maturity, 53 has been criticized both on
practical and realistic grounds. While puberty is defined by menstruation for women, and "signs of puberty" and the capability of reproducing for men, there is little definite con-elation between this standard and
concepts of mental development and capacity. Additionally, holding
women accountable from the beginning of their transitory period and
men towards the end is further evidence of the discriminatory nature and
effect of the laws in Pakistan.

II.

PAKISTAN'S HUDOOD LAWS

Prior to the enactment of the Hudood laws, Pakistan's criminal legal
system was based in toto on the principles of British common law. The
country's penal code, criminal procedure code, evidence act, and even
the comt structure were all acquired from its fonner British rulers. This
51

52

53

1980 P.Cr.L.J. 1955 Jamil Ahmed.
Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 74.
Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 53.

76 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

Anglo-Saxon system was applied to Pakistan in its entirety, with the
exception of the tribal areas, where customary law prevails to this day.
The changes that were made in 1979 to the legal status quo took the
procedures and punishments for some offences out of the conventional
structure and placed them under the new branch of Islamic law. 54
There are five ordinances and orders that make up Pakistan's
Hudood laws: The Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood)
Ordinance, 1979; The Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979; The Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance,
1979; The Execution of the Punishment of Whipping Ordinance, 1979;
and The Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. Rape, adultery, theft, armed robbery, and drinking alcohol were all offences in
Pakistan prior to the enactment of the Hudood laws. The new laws
introduced only two new crimes, that of Qazf and that of fornication. It
is important to note here that the Hudood laws apply equally to all
Pakistanis, Muslim and non-Muslim. 55
The rules of evidence for each Hadd offence are laid down in the
provisions of the Hudood Ordinances themselves. The evidentiary rules
for Ta 'azir punishments, in contrast, are found in the Qanoon-eShahadat, or the law of evidence, which is applied to all of Pakistan's
laws. Pakistan's evidence act of 1872, based on British common law,
was repealed in 1984 and replaced by the Qanoon-e-Shahadat in an
effort to bring the law of evidence in conformity with Islamic injunctions. Remarkably, the Qanoon-e-Shahadat, with the exception of nine
sections, is exactly the same as 1872' s evidence act. The differences
include a greater focus on the evidentiary principles of Islamic law,
including explicit rules regarding the required number of eyewitnesses,
their character and their competence.
Regarding the number of witnesses, one section of the Qanoon-eShahadat states that the exact number shall be determined in accordance
with the injunctions of Islam. It specifies that "evidence in matters
pertaining to financial or future obligations, if reduced to writing shall
be attested by two men, or one man and two women, so that one may
remind the other, if necessary, and evidence shall be led accordingly." 56
54
55

56

Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 23.
Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 24.
.Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 30.

THE HUDOOD LAWS ... 77

Regarding competence, the Qanoon-e-Shahadat states:
[The] Court shall determine the competence of a witness in accordance
with the qualifications prescribed by the injunctions of Islam as laid
down in the Holy Qu'ran and Sunnah for a witness, and where such
witness is not forthcoming, the Court may take the evidence of a
witness who may be available. 57

Both these differences between the Qanoon-e-Shahadat and the evidence act of 1872 have made little de facto difference to legal practices,
due in part to their vagueness, 58 though it is worthy of note that the
acceptability of evidence varies from one crime to another under Islamic
law. However, they have had one significant impact with regard to
confession and its impact on the prosecution's task. Since it is now
mandatory to enforce Hadd punishments if the required burden of proof
is met, an attained confession today effectively eliminates plea-bargaining as an available option for the prosecution during a complex investigation, as they have no discretion to offer a lighter sentence or immunity. 59
A number of observations have begged the question: what have the
Hudood Ordinances really changed in Pakistan? Critics note that
Ta 'azir punishments are more frequently applied in contrast to Hadd
punishments, evidentiary requirements with regards to Ta' azir offences
are very similar to that of the pre-Hudood law in Pakistan, and 'regular'
subordinate criminal courts are used for 'Islamic law' cases. The general
answer to the above query is a limited change, but with nonetheless
rather severe ramifications. Part of the answer lies in Ta'azir punishment for Zina, which in both theory and practice has had an adverse
impact on women. This creates a fallout effect on Qaef laws, which too
have had discriminatory effects against women. The rest of the answer,
albeit a smaller part, lies in the introduction of public whippings to
Pakistan's penal system. 60 Each of these variables are discussed below,
under the headings of the c01Tesponding legislation.
Procedurally at the level of first instance, offences of Hadd are tried
by the regular criminal courts. However, presiding justices must now be
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Muslim, unless the case involves a non-Muslim accused. Moreover,
Hadd punishments can only be executed after the Federal Shari'ah
Court, an appellate court, has heard the case. Non-Muslim lawyers may
not appear before this religious court, regardless of their client's religion. The eight justices on the Bench are ideally to be Islamic scholars
with formal legal training, though judges with both these qualifications
remain rare. The tenure of justices is three years, extendable by the
appointing authority, the President of Pakistan. Additionally, these
judges can be transferred within the country at any time. 61
Critics of the Islamic branch of Pakistan's legal system have pointed
to the lack of both security of tenure and fonnal legal training as reasons
for waning confidence and respect towards the Shari'ah Courts. One
clear example of this distrust can be found in the 1981 Hazoor Baksh
case, where the punishment of stoning to death was challenged as being
un-Islamic. 62 Of the five judges presiding, three allowed the appeal, one
dissented in part, declaring stoning to death as a Ta 'azir offence rather
than one of Hadd, and one dissented in full. The majority cited passages
from the Qur 'an, Islam's holy text, and from Hadith, or "tradition,"
which includes reported sayings or actions of the Prophet Mohammad
(peace be upon him) and is one of the sources of Islamic law. 63 These
judges rejected other Hadith as inauthentic, and used judicial tools such
as logic of omission and analogy to support their position. Upon issuance of the verdict, religious hardliners protested in the streets and
called for a review of the judgment. Under pressure, the President of
Pakistan passed a constitutional amendment granting the Federal
Shari'ah Court the power to review its own judgements. 64 Less than a
month after the challenged verdict, the Federal Shari'ah Court bench
was reconstituted, retaining only one justice. Five judges, one of whom
had already given his opinion as amicus curae during the original
hearing, were appointed to the religious court. The amicus curae, not
surprisingly, had supported stoning to death as a valid Islamic punishment. Shortly thereafter, the State of Pakistan filed a review petition,
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pursuant to which the newly reconstituted court ruled that the Federal
Shari' ah Court lacked jurisdiction to examine the Islamic character of
the Hudood Ordinances. They also allowed the appeal, in favour of
stoning to death as a valid punishment. Only one judge ruled partly in
dissent, holding that stoning to death is a Ta 'azir punishment. One of the
justices, writing in majority, concluded his judgement by stating that
"[T]his is a pure matter of belief and faith as followers of the Holy
Prophet (peace be upon him) and his Caliphs which requires no reasoning or arguments." It appeared that this judge had based his decision on
religious belief, without reasoning. This brings into question whether
judges should be allowed to do this, or if instead they should be
expected to apply and interpret the law after hearing both sides of an
issue with an open mind.
After examination of the Hazoor Baksh case, it should be of no
surprise that there is a lack of knowledge of the basic workings of the
Islamic legal branch of the system on the part of the judiciary itself. In
fact, a large number of trial court decisions reveal a total lack of
comprehension regarding the Hudood criminal legal scheme. Trained
judges of the trial court have been known to make gross errors at law
when dealing with both Islamic and non-Islamic legal principles, and
are continually being reprimanded for doing so by superior courts
(though this is not to say that those higher courts themselves have not
been guilty of gross errors). 65 One frightening example of such incompetence comes from a case in Azad Jammu and Kashmir where both a Qazi
(a member of the Ulema acting as a judge) and a sessions judge were
presiding over cases involving charges of Zina. In that case, the judgements of the Qazi were not decided on fact. The High Court later
observed that, since the Qazis generally cannot read medical reports or
reports of "chemical examiners" or pathologists, they often base their
decisions on guess work. The High Court commented that unless medical reports were all translated to Urdu or, alternatively, the Qazis were
assigned only to tasks not requiring knowledge of English, the people
would continue to be deprived of justice. 66 Yet another problem with the
Federal Shari'ah Court has been that of using non-existent facts and un65
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pleaded arguments in justifying their often inconsistent positions. This
took place in the Masood Aziz case, 67 where the bench was convinced
without apparent reason that the commission of incest is not possible.
There was no mention in the decision as to why a punishment for incest
nevertheless exists in Pakistani law.
The religious courts have also been inconsistent in their findings,
reasoning and precedent. For example, attempt to rape is punishable
with half the sentence prescribed for rape and preparation of rape is
punishable with a maximum of two years under Hadd law. 68 Unf011unately, the courts have not been consistent in interpreting these two legal
concepts. 69 In one case, the co-accused were convicted on charges of
attempted Zina, and the Federal Shari'ah Court interpreted attempt to
commit Zina as an act that would have been performed if not interrupted
by outside intervention. By contrast, under similar circumstances in a
matter of rape, the courts found a highly similar fact situation which
amounted to preparation. 70
An incompetent bench only compounds the effects of an already
inept bar. One blatant example of the compounded problem can be
found in the Saleem case. In that case, the incompetence of the lawyers
was met by the insensitivity and arrogance of the judges. The defence
attorney, who had been paid in advance, failed to show up at trial court,
and thus no cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses took
place. Not only was Mr. Saleem sentenced to a Hadd punishment, there
was no mention, even on appeal, of the incident. 71
Despite such inadequacies, the Federal Shari'ah Court now also has
jurisdiction to declare any law in Pakistan repugnant to Islam, with the
exception of constitutional provisions, Muslim personal law, fiscal law,
and procedures of the court. Upon declaration of repugnancy, the invalid provisions cease to have force and effect and the government has a
set period of time to amend the offensive legislation. 72 Appeals from the
Federal Shari'ah Court are heard by the Supreme Court - Shariah
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Bench, a bench consisting of five justices. Again, finding Ulema, or
Islamic scholars, to occupy seats on this bench has been a great challenge.
Sadly, all of these problems are adversely compounded by the fact
that the police force in Pakistan is corrupt, inefficient, excessively large,
and lacking the supervisory safeguards necessary for the proper care and
safety of female inmates. 73 This has caused many problems for the
accused who, from arrest to verdict, witness a considerably protracted
process afflicted by the legal and systemic incompetence mentioned
above.
Regarding the Hudood laws themselves, much criticism has been
levelled regarding gender discrimination. 74 While the purpose of this
paper is not to criticize Islamic injunctions themselves, one question
which may be asked is, does the Pakistani justice system benefit by
having evidentiary laws that discriminate on the basis of sex? It has been
argued above that Pakistan is neither a truly Islamic state, whatever the
definition, nor one applying a perfect set of Islamic laws. Given these
facts, alongside the caveat from Islam itself that Hadd offences are to be
treated most cautiously and are only to be punished accordingly, and
given the meeting of the strictest burdens of proof, one questions
whether Pakistan does in fact house a society that warrants a simplistic
or codified usage of religious law. Pakistan today is a society in which
men and women freely intermingle, both in the business world and in
their personal lives. This itself is contrary to the basic concepts of
mehrum or purdah, or the societal separation of males and females in the
utopic Islamic social structure. To apply Islamic gender-dependent laws
in such an 'un-Islamic' state is difficult to justify. For example, in a
society where women for the most part remained outside of the business
world, the requirement that only men can bear witnesses would pose a
far less severe a practical problem. However, in a society such as
Pakistan, which sees large-scale participation of women in the workplace, it seems unjust that a woman who witnesses a crime is disallowed
to testify, especially when the absence of that testimony could wrongfully acquit an accused.
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To espouse such laws, as valid as they may be in a hypothetical
context, as catalysts of Islamization, such as Pakistan is doing, is nothing more than wishful thinking. Change in society, especially with
regards to the proper practice of a religion, requires education and
understanding of underlying principles and the consequences of their
adherence, not the implementation of misunderstood and ill-suited laws
which do nothing more than deter justice and promote disrespect for
sacred concepts. As it is Pakistan's national sport, an analogy to cricket
would be apropos: Pakistan needs to field a trained team first, and only
afterwards begin issuing penalties and warnings. To penalize players
first in the hope that it will improve their performance and correct their
mistakes is inherently backwards, inefficient, and ultimately unfair to
the players, to the game, and to the rules themselves.
Gender based discrimination can also be cited on a more general
level. Men and women are routinely treated inequitably with regards to
character issues. In one case, a woman was criticized for being of "bad
character;" there was no mention of the man's abandonment of his wife
for over ten years. 75 Other odious examples exist, such as the granting of
favour to men in cases of rape or Zina where the woman has been found
to be of "easy virtue" or "loose character." 76 Favour has also been
granted to the accused when the victim, usually female, is seen as
"habitual."77 Men too are discriminated against by the system, albeit in
fundamentally different ways. The major problem that has plagued men
is one of favouritism by the courts on the basis of appearance; courts
have been more likely to show leniency to individuals who present a
more religious appearance. 78
The issue of admissibility of evidence and its related problems has
been mentioned above. These problems exist with regards to nonMuslim evidence as well and have been used to criticize Islamic law in
Pakistan. Pakistan continues to struggle with both its definition of Islam
and the criteria by which different sects are judged to be Muslim or not.
It was thus that the Pakistani government excommunicated the
Quadiani sect and their members outright; other groups such as the Aga
Khanis, could suffer the same fate at any time. Until such distinctions
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can be made objectively and apolitically, however, it seems both unfair
and arbitrary to attempt to impose them in the witness stand.
It is generally agreed that Pakistan's Hudood laws are imperfect
even when viewed from a purely religious standpoint, and many people
in Pakistan are asking that they be totally repealed, or at least suspended.
It seems clear that Pakistan must wait to impose true Islamic law until it
has the resources and the wherewithal to develop the fully trained team
of our analogy that such an implementation would require. 79

1. Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance

The Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance
deals with theft and highway robbery. If theft is proven to the standard
required by Hadd law, the right hand of a first time offender is to be
amputated. For a second offence the left foot is to be amputated.
Imprisonment for life is the ordained penalty for committing theft a third
time.
There are exceptions to these rules, however. 80 If one of the hands of
the offender has already been lost or the left hand or the left thumb or at
least two fingers of the left hand are missing or totally unusable by
whatever cause, in the case of a first offence his remaining hand is not to
be amputated. Similarly, a second offence would not result in an amputation where there is only one usable foot or there are only three or fewer
remaining toes on that foot. For a third offence, if it is proven to the
satisfaction of the Federal Shari'ah Court that the convict has become
sincerely penitent, they may set the offender free on terms and conditions at their discretion. There are additional exceptions, depending on
the relationship between the complainant and the offender, for various
minor categories of theft. The general Ta 'azir punishment for theft is
rigorous imprisonment for up to three years.
For highway robbery, the elements of which include the threat of
force and the intention of robbing someone, punishment varies proportionally to the nature of the offence, based on factors such as whether

79

80

Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 18.
Pakistan, supra note 6 at I I .

84 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

property has been displaced and whether injury or murder has been
committed. Punishment varies, from rigorous imprisonment for three
years in addition to thirty stripes, to the amputation of the right hand and
left foot, to capital punishment (but only if the value of the property
stolen exceeds nisab. )81 Death is only to be imposed in cases of theft
which result in murder. 82 If the victim is injured during the robbery,
additional punishment is prescribed as per the Penal Code. Parallel
exceptions exist in situations of highway robbery. 83 However, where a
left hand or right foot are missing or totally unserviceable, a maximum
of fourteen years of rigorous imprisonment and thirty stripes are prescribed as an alternative to amputation for highway theft. 84
There are other limitations and also preconditions for awarding
Hadd punishments for theft and (highway) robbery. In order to qualify
for a Hadd punishment, the value of the stolen property must be in
excess of the value of 4.457 grams of gold (approximately U.S.$100).
This value is called nisab. The value of the stolen prope1ty is to be
divided by the number of thieves, and if the amount is greater than or
equal to nisab per person, the Hadd punishment is to be awarded.
However, Hadd is not to be imposed if the offender and the victim are
closely related to each other, applying towards one's spouse, ascendants
or descendants, siblings, parents, or aunts or uncles. Such is also the
case if guests steal from the houses of their hosts, or where servants steal
from their employers. Further, the theft of wild grass, fish, birds, dogs,
pigs, intoxicants, musical instruments, or perishable foodstuffs is exempt from Hadd punishment. Additionally, if a creditor steals from his
debtor's property, the value of the debt owed is deducted from the total
amount, and if the net amount falls below nisab, Hadd is not to be
awarded. Finally, if any theft is committed under duress or of apprehension of death owing to extreme hunger or thirst, Hadd is not to be
invoked. 85
One severe criticism of Pakistani Hudood laws with regard to theft,
is the exclusion of embezzlement of public funds of any amount from its
definitional ambit. This is cited as a blatant example of the system's
81
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complete disregard for the notion of proportionality, both between
crimes and their corresponding punishments, and between penalties for
various crimes themselves. 86 This is further evidence of the discriminatory nature of Pakistan's laws and its legal system. Surely the common
man, a man or woman of the masses, cannot be expected to have access
to public funds; rather, only members of the ruling elite can. These
individuals, some themselves lawmakers, appear to have exempted
themselves in any meaningful sense from the reach of the Hudood laws,
at least in the context of theft, since the very public funds that they
would be most likely to steal are paradoxically incapable of being stolen
under the law. This has given credibility to the argument that a system
has been constructed in Pakistan in which the elite are in fact above the
law. Law, in order to render justice, needs to be applied across the land,
regardless of wealth, class, or any other socio-economic characteristics,
without exception.
Hadd laws in Pakistan also contribute in other ways to the overall
disproportional nature of the law in Pakistan. For example, if someone is
seen by two adult male Muslims to be stealing objects worth a total of
U.S.$100 from an enclosed place, he or she can be punished with the
removal of one of their hands (in the case of a first or second offence).
On the other hand, someone in the sight of several women and/or nonMuslims can steal much more money and be punished under the category of Ta 'azir, not Hadd, with far less severe penalties. The same
individuals could also steal a car and escape Hadd punishment, as long
as the car is not in an enclosed room from where it was wrongfully
taken. Again, while these apparent inconsistencies may be easily reconciled in our hypothetical utopia, Pakistan is far from being such a place,
and is hardly the ideal jurisdiction for the implementation of such laws.
Another indicator that the masses are the socio-economic group
most adversely affected by Hudood laws is the fact that a large number
of appeals from Hadd sentences are made by the convicted, not directly
to counsel, but through jail authorities for pro bona assistance. 87 Such
legal aid in Pakistan, when available at all, is largely provided by undertrained and incompetent representation. This problem is compounded
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by the fact that the vast majority of Hadd punishments are imposed upon
the poor and relatively voiceless sections of Pakistani society. 88

2. Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance
The Offence ofZina (Enforcement ofHudood) Ordinance deals with the
crimes of rape, abduction, adultery, and fornication. The word Zina
literally translates as "consensual sexual relations outside of a lawful
marriage, including adultery and fornication." Penetration is sufficient
to constitute either offence. 89 Islam holds both the man and woman
equally guilty for committing fornication, with the exception of rape, in
which case the man is held solely responsible. The commission of Zina
by a married person is considered more serious than when it is committed by a non-married individual; correspondingly, the punishment is
much more severe. Punishment for Zina can be as harsh as being stoned
to death, for married adult Muslims, or as lenient as l 00 stripes, for nonMuslim adults and single adult Muslims. For a muhsan, an adult Muslim
who is sane and either a widow, widower, divorced, or married, who has
had sexual intercourse with another sane Muslim who is married, the
punishment is stoning to death. Stoning to death must result in death,
though that need not be by the stoning itself; the law in Pakistan states
that "such of the witnesses who deposed against the convict as may be
available shall start stoning him and, while stoning is being carried on,
he may be shot dead, where upon stoning and shooting shall be
stopped. " 90
Stoning to death awarded upon confession will of course involve no
witnesses. The law is silent as to who shall then cast the first stone.
Despite these specific penalties, the courts are given much discretion in
sentencing an individual under the Zina laws. Punishment for cases that
do not meet the Hadd standards of proof ranges from rigorous imprisonment of ten years up to twenty-five years plus thirty stripes.
This ordinance also encompasses the various other offences, which
include: kidnapping; abducting or inducing a woman to compel her to
88
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marriage against her will; subjecting a kidnapped person to illicit sexual
intercourse or to unnatural lust; the buying or selling of persons for the
purposes of prostitution; and co-habitation caused by a man deceitfully
inducing, taking away, or detaining a woman in belief of lawful marriage, with criminal intent. 91
The Hudood laws in Pakistan have of course changed certain concepts legally with regard to rape and Zina from the pre-Hudood law
period. Women, unlike prior to the Hudood laws, can now be charged
with the offence of rape. Wives can no longer be considered raped.
Children can now, regardless of age, be convicted of Zina or rape.
Consent of a child can today be put forward as a defence by the accused.
Punishment for rape under the pre-Hudood criminal legal system was
banishment for life or imprisonment extending up to ten years plus a
monetary penalty92 and the rape of a wife over the age of twelve was
punishable with imprisonment of up to two years. Under the Hudood
laws, the Ta 'azir sentence for adults accused of rape is a maximum of
twenty-five years and a minimum of four years. Minors can receive up
to a five-year sentence plus a maximum of thirty stripes or lashes. 93
Additionally, under the old penal code of Pakistan, adultery was a
crime, whereas sex between unmarried consenting adults was not. The
punishment for adultery was imprisonment for five years and/or a fine.
Further, only the husband of the alleged adulteress could make complaints of adultery. If the complainant dropped charges, criminal proceedings against his wife would automatically be dropped. The adulteress could subsequently not be punished for adultery. Currently, any
individual can bring charges which cannot be dropped, under any circumstances. 94
Rape as mentioned above is an exceptional crime within the Zina
category and is worthy of further elaboration. Rape is universally one of
the most difficult crimes to prove, since witnesses are generally unavailable. Therefore, as long as the burden of proof with regard to the guilt of
the accused lies with the prosecution, courts cannot convict persons
accused of rape solely on the testimony of the victim. This principle is
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not based on the ground that the evidence of the victim is unreliable, but
is a rule of prudence recognizing that at times women may give false
evidence, just as males may. The consequence of this rule is that rape
can be proved on the evidence of the victim, but provided it is corroborated. This includes medical evidence corroboration. However in
Pakistan's social climate, with the great stigma that is attached to rape,
very few women have themselves medically examined promptly following a violation, 95 and for the same reason delay filing criminal complaints. 96 Because of this, most prosecutions of rape are dismissed. This
obviously does not imply false testimony by the victim, bmTing a
contradictory finding by the comi. Unfortunately for Pakistani women,
when a prosecution for rape fails, police go on to prosecute the victim
for adultery under the Hudood laws, knowing well that the penalty for
such a crime can be as severe as stoning to death. This approach of the
police seems to be based on two assumptions: firstly, the allegation of
the rape is false because the accused was acquitted (it is explained above
why this is in fact not the case); secondly, the allegation of rape is an
admission of sexual intercourse, therefore the dismissal of the
prosecution's case amounts to an implied confession of adultery. This
conclusion flies against all common sense, since a confession is an
admission of guilt, while an allegation of rape is a repudiation of guilt.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan in the Rehmani decision has stated
clearly that only a statement that is a clear admission of guilt, or fact
constituting guilt, is a confession. 97 lt was added in that decision that a
statement cannot be treated as a confession by relying on only inculpatory evidence, excluding anything exculpatory.
Additionally, it appears that a victim of rape now runs the risk of
being punished under Zina whether she files a complaint or not. If a
woman does, she must prove absence of consent. If she does not, the
alleged offence can be changed from that of rape to Zina and the victim
herself then becomes a co-accused. Having not filed a complaint, if she
subsequently becomes pregnant, she can be charged with Zina as well.
There have been numerous cases where the alleged rapist has been
acquitted for lack of conclusive evidence, whereas the victim went on to
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be punished for not having conclusive evidence to show that the unexplained pregnancy was because of rape. One such case was that of Safia
Bibi. 98 Although the decision of the lower court was later overturned on
appeal, the underlying problem - that of the burden of proof shifting to
the victim of rape to explain her pregnancy - was not addressed. Thus, it
appears that while the accused rapist is deemed innocent until proven
guilty, his female victim is presumed to be guilty until she proves herself
innocent. Males, too, are unfairly treated in this respect by the system at
times. A major problem has been that of courts converting charges of
rape to those of Zina when there is insufficient evidence to prove the
former. 99 Principles of criminal law would call for the accused to be
acquitted.
Yet it is not only the state prosecution that is to blame for misapplying the law as set out by the Supreme Court. Despite provisions in the
law as mentioned above with the requirement of either an un-retracted
confession or of consistent evidence from four honest and reliable male
witnesses, trial court judges in Pakistan have convicted women of
adultery solely on the basis of pregnancy. Pregnancy was treated by
these judges as either circumstantial evidence or as some so11 of implied
confession. However, circumstantial evidence is barred under the
Hudood laws and the view that an allegation of rape not proved amounts
to a confession is contrary to the law declared by the Supreme Court. 100
These judges, despite sitting on a religious bench, are under a duty to
uphold the law of the land.
The aforementioned problem of illiteracy has had resounding negative effects in the area of Zina specifically, and generally on all Hudood
crimes with regards to confession evidence. Ignorance of the law,
compounded by the lack of public access to legal information and
advice, has led to the accused themselves inadvertently sabotaging their
own cases. One case in which this occurred is Mushtaq Ahmed in which
the co-accused, under a misconception of the law and its underlying
concepts, incorrectly confessed to having committed Zina. Evidence to
98
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the contrary later established his mistake and cleared the accused of
Hudood charges. 101
In addition to the above problems inherent in the system, there are
two specific kinds of cases that are indicative of the society in which
these laws are being applied: false prosecutions filed by possessive
fathers and by ex-husbands. Social values in Pakistan are rapidly changing. For example, divorced women are now remarrying and young
women are marrying against the wishes of their fathers. Even when such
marriages are in accordance with Muslim law however, fathers have
filed cases of adultery against their own daughters and ex-husbands
have maliciously filed cases against their ex-wives under the Hudood
laws, on allegations that the women are guilty of fornication. While the
accused need only show a marriage ce1iificate or orally testify to marriage to obtain an acquittal, the agony inflicted on such women in
contesting these generally false charges is unwarranted, especially
given the stigma of such allegations in the society at large. More
problematic, however, is the fact that there are a large number of
wrongful convictions due simply to the fact that appeals are a luxury not
available to most of the poor.
Another example of inherent flaws in Pakistan's legal system can be
cited from the Mohammad Sarwar and Shahida Parveen case. In that
case Shahida was married to a Khushi Muhammad, but claimed that she
had divorced him prior to marrying the man who was her co-accused in
Zina. Mr. Muhammad denied the divorce. A divorce deed was placed on
record by the defence, allegedly bearing Mr. Muhammad's signature.
Under Pakistan's family laws, all Muslim divorces have to be registered. Doing so after oral pronunciation upon the wife by the exhusband as failure to do so is an offence. There is no time limit on the
registration however, and the offence is thus pragmatically ineffective.
This allows men to effectively disallow their ex-wives from re-marrying, without her knowing. This in turn means that the ex-husband can
threaten allegations of Zina at any time, which is inherently unfair to the
woman and can easily be used against her in the most severe way,
considering the potential consequences of penalty. In Shahida's case,
the law worked against her as the divorce deed was not registered. 102
101
102
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Other tragic situations have stemmed from marriages ultimately
held to be void. Evidence of couples having lived together, despite being
under the impression of valid matrimony, has been taken to constitute
confession to Zina. 103 Uniquely and fortunately, this confession may be
officially retracted, sending the case for re-trial to the regular, more
secular courts. 104

3. Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance
The Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance relates mostly to
false allegations of Zina and is punishable with eighty stripes. However,
for successful prosecution, it must be proven that the allegations are
made intentionally and clearly imputing Zina. Insinuation is not enough,
and in fact, it appears that the allegations must be made maliciously. 105
While the evidentiary requirements for Qazf are the same as those
for theft and the other non-Zina Hadd offences, an exception is made for
charges of adultery made by a husband against his wife. In such cases,
the husband must first swear by Allah four times that his allegation is
true and then a fifth time, saying that the curse of Allah may be upon him
if he is lying. The wife can then rebut his allegation by similarly
swearing a total of five times that the allegation is false and that if she is
lying that the curse of Allah may be upon her. Not only is the allegation
of the husband then rebutted, the marriage is automatically dissolved.
This process is known as Lian.
Another exception to the general law is that Qa:zf made against a
descendant does not attract Hadd punishment, but that of Ta 'azir; the
Ta 'azir punishment for Qazf being a maximum of two years imprisonment plus forty stripes. Additionally, the victim of Qazf must be a
muhsan, hence Qazf committed against persons who are not capable of
sexual intercourse will not attract Hadd. Consequently as well, Hadd
will also not be awarded if false allegations are made against nonMuslims, unmarried minors or old people who are no longer capable of
intercourse.
Jahangir & Jilani, supra note 12 at 55.
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Procedurally, charges of Qazf, unlike in cases of Zina, can be
dropped by the complainant with finality. 106 Also, the police cannot
make an anest of Qazf without a wanant. 107 This however has not rendered Pakistan's law of Qa-".f immune from criticism and misapplication.
Examples of such have been cited above under the heading of Zina laws.

4. Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order
Prohibition was first imposed in Pakistan in the year 1977 by the
government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with the promulgation of the Prohibition Act of 1977. The Prohibition (Enforcement of
Hadd) Order, enacted two years later made certain alterations to its
predecessor, including the cunent prohibition against drinking alcohol,
which applies to all Muslims in Pakistan. The Order initially exempted
the use of drugs from punishment, a seeming inconsistency better understood from a sociological perspective than a theological one. Narcotics
were rarely used in Pakistan prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and the ensuing refugee crisis during the 1970s. Drugs were therefore
not a major concern to Pakistani lawmakers of the time, though use has
steadily been growing and drugs are now a widely sought substitute to
legally unavailable alcohol. The use, traffic, and sale of narcotics have
thus subsequently been added to the Hudood laws.
As with each of the Hudood laws, exceptions have been legislated
for the use of alcohol in Pakistan. Non-Muslim Pakistanis may be issued
permits to use liquor, but only for religious ceremonies. 108 Additionally,
an exception exists for non-Muslim foreigners who may be issued
permits for drinking liquor of a "reasonable amount." It appears that this
'reasonable amount' is discretionary. What is unclear is whose discretion it is up to, other than a judge at trial. The condition, for both these
exceptions, is that drinking is not to take place at any public place
including hotels, motels, and clubs, excluding private rooms occupied
by the permit holder. In addition, the licence holder may not enter a
public place in a drunken state.
10
"
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The Hadd punishment of drinking for Muslims is eighty stripes, and
for cases that do not fall in the category of drinking liable to Hadd
(including illegal drinking by non-Muslims) rigorous imprisonment for
up to three years or a maximum of thirty stripes, or both. Additionally,
punishments are provided for the illegal import, export, transpo1i,
manufacture, possession, packing, sale, or service of any intoxicant,
including alcohol.
Evidentiary laws for drinking liable to Hadd require proof of two
witnesses, Muslim males of piety. But there is one qualifier: they need
not be eyewitnesses. These witnesses may be from the medical profession or be laypersons that have only smelled liquor from the mouth or
vomit of the offender. One exception to this exception is that the
prosecution needs to establish that the drink was not taken or owing to
extreme hunger or thirst. 109
Procedurally, Pakistan's prohibition laws state that arrest can only
be made after a medical test has been carried out on the accused. Police
cannot arrest those drinking privately without a warrant. If a police
officer arrests someone solely on the suspicion of drinking, they can
themselves be imprisoned for up to six months, in addition to being
financially penalized. Not surprisingly, most people who have been
charged under this Order have been from the lower economic strata of
society. 110 This is yet another indicator of the inherent and systemic bias
of Pakistan's legal system against its poor masses. Alcohol, being illegal
and mostly imported, is obviously sold in Pakistan at a premium; likely
a premium the poor cannot afford. Thus, while the ruling and moneyed
elite are the most likely in Pakistan's society to indulge in the purchase
and use of alcohol, they are effectively exempt from punishment. Further, the fact that this is the only Hudood law in Pakistan to carry a
possible penalty for mistakes made by police officers is yet more
evidence of the lawmakers protecting themselves from what they would
most likely find themselves guilty of. The police, after all, are unlikely
to risk imprisonment over a single arrest.
Finally, while trial courts have been generally incompetent in
awarding Hadd punishment as a result of the many exclusionary provisions in the law, 111 appellant courts have been quick in converting them
109
110
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to those of a Ta'azir level, 112 except in cases of drinking offences. 113
This, too, may be seen as another example of the bench protecting the
interests of the elite in Pakistani society.

III.

CONCLUSION

Surah 5, Al Ma'idah, Ayat 40 translates to: "Knowest thou not that to
Allah (alone) belongeth the dominion of the heavens and the earth? He
punisheth whom He pleaseth, and He forgiveth whom He pleaseth: and
Allah hath power over all things." 114 In a further clarification, the first
line, "Knowest thou not" is footnoted:
Punishment really does not belong to mortals, but to Allah alone.
Only, in order to keep civil society together, and protect innocent
people from crime, certain principles are laid down on which people
can build up their criminal law. But we must always remember that
Allah not only punishes but forgives, and.forgiveness is the attribute
which is most prominently placed before us. It is not our wisdom that
can readily define the bounds of forgiveness or punishment, but His
will or Plan, which is the true standard of righteousness and justice. 115

It is precisely this principle that those manning the Pakistani legal
system are missing. If the citizens, police, and justices were to truly

follow Islam by showing and practicing mercy, the effects of the
Hudood laws would be far closer to what they are meant to be: just.
However, if such were the case, it would mean that Pakistan understands
its predominant religion and is following it as an Islamic state. As seen
above, such is not the case. In this widely illiterate nation, the religion,
as practiced, is based on what could be described as an "Islam for
Dummies" approach, while Islam in its full complexity goes essentially
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113 Criminal Appeal No.222/1 of 1985 Muhammad Anwar; Criminal Appeal No.225/L of 1985
Asghar Ali.
114 The Holy Qur'an- English translation of the meanings and Commentary, King Fahd Holy
Qur'an Printing Complex, Al-Madinah Al- Munawarah, 1410 H.
115
Ibid. [emphasis added].
112

THE HUDOOD LAWS ... 95

unstudied. Added to this are widespread cultural ailments including
mass discrimination against women, systemic coITuption, endemic illiteracy, incompetent members of the bar and judiciary, and all the other
chronic ills of a developing nation, prominent among them a poor
institutional infrastructure. These problems all lead to only one conclusion; that the Hudood laws in Pakistan must be suspended immediately
and indefinitely, until such time that the nation is deemed socioeconomically, culturally, and religiously prepared to implement Islamic
law, as per its divine precepts. Failure to do so will allow the current
injustice and mockery of Islamic law to continue, the effects of which
will throw the masses into further feelings of helplessness, despair, and
inequality with regards to the ruling elite. This has the potential to create
acute instability at the grassroots level, which in turn could lead to
rebellions by various groups against the union of Pakistan, or even a
full-scale revolution directed against the current law makers and ruling
class. It has been noted repeatedly in this essay that the lawmakers have
tilted the legal system in their favour. To keep these laws in place may
ultimately prove to do just the opposite.
In the meantime, Pakistan needs to develop a knowledgeable group
of scholars of the Shari 'ah and offiqah law and needs to recognize that
all sources of Islamic law must be used in the development of an Islamic
legal 'code,' including proper analogy and consensus of a credible and
revered Ulema. Additionally, it needs to incorporate the general principles of the religion in its laws and implementing system, including the
re-opening of the door of ijtihad and emphasizing the principle of
mercy, as referred to above, from the Qur'an. Procedurally, Pakistan
needs to reassess its legal infrastructure, including the duality of its
courts and plurality of its legal doctrine. Only after these issues are
examined and implemented with credibility can a more fundamental and
permanent change be considered.

